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Executive summary 
Violence and vulnerability 
This report examines prevailing understandings of violence in Nairobi and how it is 
addressed, as well as the limitations of existing violence mitigation measures. Violence and 
crime are endemic in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, where they enmesh with wider 
problems of vulnerability. Widespread poverty and lack of livelihood opportunities for a large 
proportion of the urban poor exacerbate their vulnerability to being victimised by non-state 
violent actors and sectors of the state implicated inciting and perpetrating violence and crime. 
The failure of the state to provide for basic needs in health, education and social care, as 
well as a lack of effective policing, has created an opening that criminal organisations and 
gangs have exploited. In poorer areas of Nairobi, they provide illegal connections to public 
utilities, mediate access to economic opportunities, and operate protection rackets. In some 
cases, these activities have been carried out with the knowledge and sometimes active 
involvement of the state. 
There is a close and growing association between violence and politics in Kenya, which is 
inflected with ethnic, regional and religious differences. Ethnicised political violence has 
existed in Kenya since the early 1990s and has become more widespread since. During the 
post-election violence that swept Kenya in 2007–8, Nairobi’s poorest areas were carved into 
enclaves where vigilante groups and criminal organisations associated with different ethnic 
groups patrolled ‘their’ areas, demanding to see identity cards, carrying out evictions and 
attacking the homes and retail premises of members of opposing ethnic groups. The failure 
of the state to provide effective policing in Nairobi’s poorer neighbourhoods has meant that 
control and enforcement of order have become the preserve of non-state violent actors, as 
well as other community mobilisation efforts, leading to new forms of insecurity for residents 
of these areas. What becomes ethnic violence or political violence often begins as criminal 
violence such as theft, burglary or murder. Vigilante responses can easily escalate into a 
more serious conflict with ethnic inflections if the alleged perpetrator of a crime is a member 
of a different ethnic group. 
Many non-state violent actors such as the Mungiki (a secretive sect and banned criminal 
organisation) oscillate between working as enforcers and mobilisers for politicians and 
operating as criminal outfits. While violence instigated by national political figures is certainly 
an important part of understanding the dynamics of Kenya’s contemporary violence, multiple 
levels of governance and politics need to be considered, with the role of community-level 
political entrepreneurs being especially crucial. 
Limits of law and order approach 
Prevailing responses to violence and crime in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods assume that 
there is a lack of law and order and that more robust policing and tougher laws can increase 
security. Violence-mitigation approaches have involved more robust policing measures such 
as raids and operations to round up low-level criminals, and increased use of ‘stop and 
search’ and of surveillance. Police raids are at times characterised by the indiscriminate use 
of excessive force, and sections of the police forces in Kenya are implicated in extra-judicial 
killings and assassinations, among other serious human rights violations. Other measures 
that have been tried include clearing hawkers from pavements in the city centre and cracking 
down on matatus (privately owned public service vehicles) that provide work for young 
people. These measures, however, have done nothing to reduce crime and violence and 
actually aggravate the underlying causes of insecurity. 
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The argument that increased policing will reduce violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods 
assumes that the police can act effectively. However, institutional weaknesses and 
incapacities as well as the corruption and alleged complicity of some police actors in criminal 
activity undermine public trust and confidence in the Kenya Police Service. Public opinion 
polling has found that a majority of Nairobians overall, and in poor neighbourhoods 
specifically, trust vigilante groups more than the police forces to respond to crime; they also 
favour a different type of policing involving greater coordination with community actors and 
groups. More robust policing measures are unlikely to succeed without fundamental reforms 
to existing policing institutions, an end to impunity for crimes and abuses committed by 
sections of the police, and reforms to make the formal justice system more accessible and 
responsive to the needs of the poor. 
Need for a wider approach 
The effectiveness of stronger policing measures is also limited because they do little to 
respond to a problem that has multiple drivers. While official responses to violence and crime 
in Nairobi have generally involved the temporary use of more robust policing measures, 
existing evidence on what causes violence and crime suggests that these measures are 
unlikely to be effective in reducing levels of violence and crime over the long term. A different 
approach is required to address more deeply rooted problems of poverty and unemployment, 
particularly among young people, and of the lack of basic services provided in poor 
neighbourhoods. Public opinion surveys also indicate that measures to address youth 
unemployment and improve the urban environment – through, for example, better street 
lighting and infrastructure – can make a positive difference in addressing violence and crime 
in poor neighbourhoods. 
In practice, there have been efforts such as the Safer Nairobi Initiative that aspire to a more 
coordinated effort to improve urban security by involving agencies and departments with 
mandates to deliver public services and create work opportunities. The initiative, which was 
endorsed by the Nairobi City Council in 2005, fell victim to a political tug-of-war between 
council officials and representatives of the Provincial Administration at the time. The initiative 
was also hamstrung by a lack of public confidence in the city council. Nonetheless, the spirit 
of such efforts to develop a joined-up multisectoral approach is needed to improve security 
for the urban poor. 
This report assesses a number of measures that could be incorporated in a wider strategy to 
address and mitigate violence. These include policies to extend economic opportunities and 
employment to young people: 
 The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project of the Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
(KEPSA) aims to build the capacity of youth through internships and training. 
Kazi kwa Vijana is a national public works programme that provides low-wage 
work for young people. However, these interventions are few in a context of 
widespread youth unemployment. Many interventions focus on 
entrepreneurship even though many young people have little interest in 
running their own business and lack the ability to do so. Public visibility of 
these interventions is also low and the agencies have not done enough to 
reach the potential beneficiaries. Further, lacking a national policy on youth 
employment, there have been few efforts to connect the multitude of state and 
non-state initiatives. 
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 One positive measure was the decision by the Ministry of Finance to remove 
the import duty on motorcycles in 2008. This significantly reduced the cost of 
motorcycles, allowing many young people to purchase them for starting a taxi 
business. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some young people who were 
previously involved in crime ceased to be so when they entered the 
motorcycle transport business and, thus, the measure helped to reduce crime. 
Other measures to improve service delivery help to address some of the factors that make 
the poor vulnerable to violence: 
 The construction of ‘bio-centres’ (sanitation facilities) by the Umande Trust in 
Kibera and Korogocho areas of Nairobi. In Huruma, the group Getto Green, 
led by young people, initiated a number of income-generating activities for its 
members, some of whom were previously involved in crime. The Adopt A 
Light Company has erected light masts in slums, which some slum residents 
believe has helped to reduce crime. 
 The Water Services Trust Fund and the Water Services Board under the 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation has established water kiosks in some poor 
neighbourhoods, which are operated by licensed water vendors. The opening 
times of the water kiosks are regulated as are the tariffs, which must be 
displayed. The water kiosks have greatly reduced the distance travelled to 
fetch water, especially by women, thus increasing their security in areas that 
are prone to violent crime. 
Priorities for action 
This study proposes the following priorities to address and mitigate the impacts of violence 
on the poor in Nairobi: 
 Formulation of a policy framework to promote multisectoral and cross-
agency inputs to address and mitigate violence and crime. In spite of the 
shortcomings of the Safer Nairobi Initiative, a policy framework is required to 
promote coordination and coherence of inputs across sectors and multiple 
levels of governance. The current context in which devolved structures of 
governance are being implemented under the new constitution provides an 
opportunity to formulate such a framework. Under the constitution, security 
remains the mandate of the central government but the delivery of most 
services is now the responsibility of county governments, with the role of 
central government limited to policy formulation and coordination in areas 
such as the provision of water and health. 
 Incorporating analysis of politics and violence into assessment of 
policies and measures to strengthen youth employment and basic 
services in poor neighbourhoods. Although it is well known that a wider 
approach is required to address and mitigate violence in Nairobi’s poor 
neighbourhoods, there is no systematic effort to assess how initiatives to 
address youth unemployment or improve the delivery of basic services affect 
the vulnerability of the poor to violence and crime. Thus, policy stakeholders 
have little insight into what works, in which circumstances and how. Monitoring 
and evaluation of efforts to improve youth employment and basic services in 
poor neighbourhoods should assess how they intersect with politics and 
violence. Doing so will strengthen the evidence base of what measures can 
make a difference and how. 
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 Learning from existing community efforts to address and mitigate 
violence. Responses to violence are rarely informed by community-level 
knowledge and expertise on what is likely to work. While there have been 
many local-level efforts to address violence in Nairobi’s poor urban 
neighbourhoods, many of these are undocumented and not known beyond the 
neighbourhoods where they are implemented. They therefore remain largely 
invisible. Yet, it is important to identify, monitor and learn from how local 
initiatives seek to address violence, with what consequences and for whom. 
 Further rigorous empirical analysis of the setting and circumstances of 
violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods. There is a lack of detailed, 
disaggregated data and evidence to do a forensic analysis of the causes of 
violence that could be used to craft more effective policy, legal, policing and 
development measures. Given that much of the violence in poor 
neighbourhoods is carried out by criminal organisations and often linked to 
complex local-level political struggles, the nuances and complexities of 
political dynamics at this level are often difficult to see and understand. Thus, 
new empirical data are required, drawing on intimate local knowledge. 
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1 Introduction 
Violence and crime are part of everyday life in many of Nairobi’s poor urban neighbourhoods. 
Nairobi was a flashpoint for violence and tensions in the aftermath of the disputed December 
2007 elections, with 124 fatalities reported in the city, mostly in its poorest areas. Officially, 
more than 72,000 were displaced in Nairobi’s slums, not counting the much larger number of 
displaced people who sought refuge in friendly neighbourhoods in other parts of the city or 
left the city for their rural homes.1 Yet, the post-election violence simply brought into stark 
relief the endemic violence and crime that affects the lives of the urban poor in Nairobi as 
well as the discrepancy that exists in security between the city’s poor and better-off 
residents. While wealthier enclaves of the city are heavily guarded by private security firms, 
violence and protection provided through criminal organisations and vigilante groups has 
become commonplace in the poor neighbourhoods. Up to two-thirds of the population of the 
city’s informal settlements and slums report that they do not feel safe (Oxfam GB 2009). 
The failure of the state to provide a range of basic goods and services compounds the 
experience of crime and violence for the urban poor in Nairobi. For example, most residents 
of slums rely on public toilet facilities, having to walk through a warren of dark alleys at night. 
The provision of connections to public utilities such as electricity and water is also scarce, 
with criminal gangs often controlling access to illegal electricity connections as well as some 
water-vending points. Limited access to services, often under the control of criminal 
organisations and gangs, combined with low levels of household income, are thought to fuel 
the conditions that lead to crime and violence and allow it to persist (World Bank 2010: 221). 
The governments of both President Daniel arap Moi and his successor, Mwai Kibaki, over 
the years failed to measurably improve security for the urban poor. Rather, they reflected a 
narrow understanding of the problem as one of ordinary crime that can be stamped out with 
more robust policing measures. These include raids to round up low-level criminals, 
increased use of ‘stop and search’, stepping up police presence in certain hotspots, and 
increasing surveillance. However, corruption and ineffectiveness is rife in official institutions 
for security and justice and the public’s trust and confidence is low. Moreover, sections of the 
state have been implicated in inciting, supporting and benefiting from violence. 
Unsurprisingly, in this context, existing law and order responses to violence in Nairobi’s poor 
urban neighbourhoods have not reduced insecurity and have aggravated the situation by 
further undermining relations between the police and poor urban residents. 
Given the complex drivers of violence in Nairobi, and the close associations between politics 
and violence in Kenya, a different approach is needed that addresses the underlying factors 
making the poor more vulnerable to violence, including their lack of access to basic services 
and economic opportunities.2 More robust law and order measures will be effective only if 
there are further significant policing and judicial reforms to re-establish public trust and 
confidence. The security of the urban poor is more likely to be increased through a broader 
approach encompassing measures that reduce their susceptibility to being victimised and 
that build on existing local efforts to address interlocking vulnerabilities. 
This report is organised as follows. The first section reviews existing data on welfare and 
violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods and identifies key gaps in understanding. The 
second section unpacks official understandings of violence and crime, while the third 
examines various policy interventions to address violence in poor urban neighbourhoods and 
the limitations of these. The report concludes with practical proposals for a different approach 
to address and mitigate violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods. 
                                               
1
 See: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008). 
2
 Many of Kenya’s politicians often sponsor militias and criminal groups during election periods. 
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2 Welfare and violence in Nairobi slums 
Much of the violence in Nairobi is concentrated in the city’s densely populated informal 
settlements, where an estimated half of its three to four million residents live on 
approximately five per cent of the city’s total land area.3 The city’s slums are characterised by 
insecure land tenure, poor housing (many of them shacks), poor or non-existent 
infrastructure for drainage and sanitation, and lack of access roads, water and other services 
such as electricity (Mitullah 2003). Only 12 per cent of slum residents have access to a 
supply of piped water (Oxfam 2009) compared with an average of 71–72 per cent for the city 
overall. Because piped water is not widely available in slums, the poor are forced to buy 
water from private vendors, often paying up to eight times what the better-off do (Oxfam 
2009: 14). The average monthly per capita income of a slum household is approximately 
US$49 compared with an average of US$80 for non-slum households in the city (World Bank 
2006). At least 26 per cent of the slum population is unemployed, although for young people 
unemployment levels reach nearly 50 per cent (World Bank 2006). Furthermore, 49 per cent 
of those who report they are employed are often involved in casual work, which is insecure. 
No statistics are available to indicate unemployment levels in poor neighbourhoods as a sub-
set of the city’s population as a whole, but the assumption is that they are far higher. 
Insecurity and violence are ranked as one of the top three Kenyan public priorities; slum-
dwellers specifically report insecurity and violence to be one of the major problems they 
face.4 In public opinion polling, up to two-thirds of residents in slum areas report that they do 
not feel safe in their own neighbourhoods (Oxfam 2009: 14). Moreover, ‘insecurity brought 
about by the perception of widespread violence and impending crime, can often be more 
destructive to the fabric of social and economic life, than the actual criminal act itself’ (UN 
Habitat 2002: 8). However, there is a lack of detailed, disaggregated data and evidence to do 
a forensic analysis of the causes of violence that could be used to craft more effective policy, 
legal, policing and development measures. Only the Kenyan Police regularly collects crime 
data but its reliability is questioned. Police reports often only capture serious offences or 
crimes they consider to be ‘legitimate’ (UN Habitat 2002: 10). The National Crime Research 
Centre was established in 1997 to undertake studies and collect data on crime but it has 
never been effectively operationalised. Corruption and political manipulation as well as 
organisational inefficiencies also hinder crime-recording practices (Hills 2008). 
Beyond official crime statistics, there is a small amount of survey data on the types of crime 
people experience, the perceived causes of these, and levels of public confidence and trust 
in different institutions that administer security and justice.5 A UN Habitat victimisation survey 
carried out in 2001 found that 37 per cent of all respondents had been robbed in the 12 
months preceding the survey, 22 per cent had experienced theft from their person, 18 per 
cent had experienced physical assault (see Figure 2.1), and 29 per cent had experienced 
burglary from their property (UN Habitat 2002). 
                                               
3
 In 2009 the Kenyan Population and Housing Census recorded that at least 33.7 per cent of the population of Nairobi lived in 
slums. However, using different criteria to define a ‘slum’ area, UN Habitat (2002) estimates that 70 per cent of Nairobi’s 
population resides in these areas. See also: Agostini, Chianese, French and Sandhu (2010); Mitullah (2003). 
4
 Insecurity and violence was ranked as one of the top three Kenyan public priorities in 2012 and 2013 opinion polls: 
www.ipsos.co.ke/home/index.php/downloads. See also: Omenya and Lubaale (2012); Gimode (2001). 
5
 Although police collect data on crimes such as homicides, the data is not regularly available to the public. The reliability of the 
data is also suspect. 
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Figure 2.1 Personal crimes in Nairobi 
 
Source: UN Habitat 2002. 
When asked to report the most important problems facing their communities, a World Bank 
(2010) survey of residents in two slum areas, Korogocho and Viwandani, found that crime 
and violence was the most important problem, followed by unemployment (see Figure 2.2). 
Unemployment was thought to be the primary cause of crime and violence by most 
respondents in the UN Habitat survey. A more recent public attitudes survey found that 
unemployment was thought to be the main reason for crime (Teresia 2011: 281). Poverty 
was ranked the second most important cause of crime. 
Figure 2.2 Significant problems reported by community members in 
Korogocho and Viwandani slums compared with overall 
Nairobi sample 
 
Source: World Bank 2010: 229. 
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A common theme in all surveys of violence and crime is that most people do not report 
crimes they have experienced to the police (UN Habitat 2002: 103; Human Rights Watch 
2008; Gimode 2001). The perception that the police forces are corrupt is nearly universal: 98 
per cent of respondents in the UN Habitat survey felt the police were corrupt. An Oxfam 
(2009: 14) study found that nearly half of survey respondents acknowledged having to pay a 
bribe. These findings are backed up by the 2012 East African Bribery Index (EABI), which 
found that the police forces are the most corrupt state institution in Kenya.6 Thus, most 
people do not consider it worthwhile reporting crimes to the police. Furthermore, the UN 
Habitat survey found that 36 per cent of respondents attribute crime directly or indirectly to 
the police force (UN Habitat 2002: 33). Even if a crime is reported and a suspect 
apprehended, the justice system itself is also considered to be corrupted and, thus, 
ineffectual (Hodess and Lavers 2006). 
Institutionalised corruption has undermined trust in the police and courts, pushing people to 
seek other avenues for justice and security.7 A World Bank survey found that vigilante groups 
garner the greatest trust of Nairobi’s population overall as well as of those living in 
Korogocho and Viwandani, two poor neighbourhoods of the city. In Korogocho, 70.6 per cent 
trust vigilante groups to reduce crime and violence, compared with only 6.5 per cent who 
trust the Administration police and 4.4 per cent who trust the Kenya police. In some 
neighbourhoods, addressing crime and violence has become an important part of 
associational life. The World Bank survey found that 14.8 per cent of those surveyed in 
Viwandani trust community or neighbourhood organisations to reduce crime and violence, 
more than those who report they trust the local chief or Kenya police (see Table 2.1 below). 
Table 2.1 Levels of trust in institutions to reduce crime and violence 
 General Korogocho Viwandani 
Vigilante group 56.5 70.6 41.6 
Administration police 14.4 6.5 22.6 
Community or neighbourhood organisation 9.2 3.9 14.8 
Local chief/assistant chief  9.0 10.5 7.4 
Kenya police 4.9 4.4 5.5 
N/R 3.7 2.2 5.3 
Religious organisation 1.5 1.5 1.4 
Social service organisation 0.3 0.2 0.5 
N/A 0.3 0.0 0.7 
Local and community health centre 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Source: World Bank 2010: 234 
 
                                               
6
 See: Transparency International Kenya: www.tikenya.org. 
7
 Since the promulgation of a new constitution in 2010, significant reforms of the judiciary have been undertaken, restoring 
considerable confidence in the judiciary. However, the police and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions have not 
matched the judiciary’s pace in reforms. Consequently, failures in the investigation and prosecution of crimes continue to 
undermine the gains of the reformed judiciary. 
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3 Understandings of violence in Nairobi 
Official responses to violence and crime in Nairobi have generally involved the temporary 
use of more robust policing measures; however, existing evidence on what causes violence 
and crime suggests that these measures are unlikely to be effective in reducing levels of 
violence and crime over the long term. There are four main explanations of violence in 
Nairobi: failings in law and order; political disorder; unemployment and poverty; and 
inequality and a lack of social services contributing to tensions. Each of these is examined 
below. 
3.1 Violence as a law and order problem 
Prevailing responses to violence and crime in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods assume that 
there is a lack of law and order and that more robust policing and tougher laws can increase 
security. The argument runs that the failure of the police to patrol poorer neighbourhoods has 
created an environment conducive to crime and extra-legal killings by non-state groups. 
Historically, police stations have been located outside the slums and police patrols are 
largely restricted to the main road or periphery of these areas (Mutahi 2011). Police and 
security actors in Kenya argue that the police should increase their presence in poor 
neighbourhoods and that doing so will help to stem violence and crime (Omeje and Githigaro 
2012). Even some independent analysts and human rights actors have argued that 
increased police presence is needed to address violence in slum areas (Amnesty 
International: 2010). In an effort to curb gang activity, the Kenya government enacted the 
Prevention of Organised Crimes Act (2010) which spells out tough measures to deal with 
criminal gangs. It imposes jail terms ranging from 15 years to life imprisonment for those 
found guilty of membership of criminal groups or involvement in the activities of organised 
criminal groups. The law also provides harsh penalties for anyone involved in fundraising, 
organising or directing members of a criminal gang to commit crimes. The view of violence 
underlying this law is that violence thrives in the absence of tough punitive measures. 
The argument that increased policing will reduce violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods 
assumes that the police can act effectively. Yet, as explained above, public confidence and 
trust in the police are low. Policing in poor neighbourhoods typically involves raids and 
operations to round up low-level criminals (Ruteere 2008), while crime bosses and financers 
of violence are untouched. Police raids are characterised by the indiscriminate use of 
excessive force and sections of the police forces in Kenya are implicated in extra-judicial 
killings and assassinations, among other serious human rights violations (World Bank 2010).8 
For example, following his official visit to Kenya in 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial executions in Kenya, Philip Alston, stated: ‘Killings by police in Kenya are 
systematic, widespread and carefully planned. They are committed at will and with utter 
impunity’ (OHCHR 2009). Alston also found that death squads were set up on the orders of 
senior police officials to exterminate the Mungiki, a proscribed organisation with large 
membership in some poorer neighbourhoods of Nairobi where it runs protection rackets and 
controls access to public utilities as well as public transport routes. Public opinion monitoring 
has also shown that many Kenyans support heavy police tactics, arguing that that is the only 
way to handle crime and the proliferation of gangs. However, this has to do with the lack of 
trust and faith in the criminal justice system. No evidence exists to suggest that extra-judicial 
killings have lowered levels of crime or diminished the influence of gangs Mutahi 2011:14; 
Ruteere 2008). 
                                               
8
 See also: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008). 
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For most slum residents, any encounter with the police is as much a source of insecurity as 
security. Slum populations ‘live on the margins of “illegality”, characterized by unlawful 
acquisition of housing, non-payment of taxes, and the illegal tapping of water and electricity, 
among others’. (Mutahi 2011: 12). For many of the residents of these poor neighbourhoods, 
increased police presence means petty harassment for infractions such as hawking without 
required licences, increased stop and searches by the police and intensified pressure to pay 
bribes to police officers for all manner of offences, or to prevent arrest (Mutahi 2011). A 
majority of residents of poor neighbourhoods in Nairobi favour a different type of policing, 
based on trust and coordination with community actors and groups (World Bank 2010). Thus, 
more robust policing measures are unlikely to succeed without fundamental reforms to 
existing policing institutions, an end to impunity for crimes and abuses committed by sections 
of the police, and reforms to make the formal justice system more accessible and responsive 
to the needs of the poor. 
Access and quality of justice in Kenya have for long been skewed against the poor. For many 
poor Kenyans, the costs of securing justice though the courts are completely beyond their 
means. In a 2012 Judiciary Perception Survey, 62 per cent of respondents felt that access to 
justice was prohibitively expensive; 61 per cent reported they had no access to legal services 
(Infotrak Research and Consulting 2012). A 2005 report on reforms of the governance, 
justice, law and order sector in Kenya noted that over 75 per cent of defendants in criminal 
proceedings are undefended (Republic of Kenya 2005). 
3.2 Violence as a manifestation of political divisions and conduct 
There is a close association between violence and politics in Kenya. This association is 
growing and inflected with ethnic, regional and religious differences. Ethnicised political 
violence has existed in Kenya since the early 1990s and has become more widespread since 
then.9 It first emerged in the multi-ethnic region of Rift Valley in 1991 when members of 
communities regarded as hostile to the then president, Daniel Arap Moi, were targeted. The 
violence left an estimated 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch 1993; 
Republic of Kenya 1999). For most of the 1990s, ethnicised-political violence was largely 
confined to rural areas. Throughout the 1990s, the Mungiki emerged as an important actor, 
emerging first as a defence militia for Kikuyu residing in the Rift Valley. Mungiki’s influence 
then spread to poorer neighbourhoods of Nairobi, particularly in the build-up to the 1997 
elections, when ethnicised-political violence flared again in the Rift Valley as well as in Coast 
Province. Although the 2002 general elections were characterised by lower levels of 
violence, an estimated 323 people were killed (Mutahim 2005: 69-96). 
Writing in 2002 after appalling acts of violence in Nairobi’s Kariobangi North Estate resulted 
in 20 deaths in one night, Anderson (2002) noted there was a danger of vigilante groups 
becoming political instruments for hire by those with the money to pay. Foretelling future 
violence, he explained ‘that the concerned citizens of Nairobi are therefore right to fear that 
the violence… is indicative of a deeper problem than the squabbles of rival urban gangs, and 
that the vigilantes… will become political instruments in the electoral struggle for the city.’ 
(Anderson 2002: 554). During the 2008 violence, Human Rights Watch reported that the 
city’s largest slums – Mathare and Kibera – were carved into enclaves where vigilante 
groups associated with different ethnic groups patrolled ‘their’ areas, demanding to see 
identity cards, carrying out evictions and attacking the homes and retail premises of 
members of opposing ethnic groups (Human Rights Watch 2008). Simmering rent tensions 
were violently addressed: largely Luo slum-dwellers evicted mainly Kikuyu landlords while 
the Kikuyu enlisted the Mungiki and other groups to evict Luo tenants from ‘their’ areas 
(Jakobs 2011). A section of Huruma in Mathare consisting of easily flammable shacks was 
                                               
9
 See for instance: Kagwanja (2001); Republic of Kenya (1999); Human Rights Watch (1993). See also: Throup and Hornsby 
(1998). 
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levelled. Kikuyu properties were targeted but the flames quickly spread, setting alight a large 
swath of the neighbourhood. So in demand were these groups, and so woefully inadequate 
was protection from the state’s security forces, that young men in some neighbourhoods 
allegedly organised themselves into groups they called ‘Mungiki’ and offered their services to 
wealthy politicians and businesspeople, even though they had no formal association with the 
Mungiki organisation. 
Dominant explanations of Kenya’s political violence have focused on the role of powerful 
political actors in inciting members of their own communities against others as well as 
exploiting grievances over the issues of land and national political leadership in order to 
foment violence.10 Reports from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Watch and from two government inquiries – 
the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes and the Judicial 
Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya – concluded that senior 
government officials allied to then government of President Daniel Arap Moi instigated the 
1991 and 1997 violence (Republic of Kenya 1992; Republic of Kenya 1999). 
According to these reports, senior politicians and government officials were said to have 
used ethnic militias to perpetrate violence against political opponents. Camouflaged as 
traditional warrior formations, militia groups such ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, ‘Pokot Warriors’ and 
‘Maasai Morans’ became the tools used to silence political opposition and displace potential 
voters ahead of the 1992 and 1997 general elections. Many of these groups established 
symbiotic links with the ruling party youth structures and even the police. For their part, the 
communities targeted for attack by such groups also quickly created their own defence 
structures that often mimicked those of the state-sponsored attackers. Ethnic Kikuyu in the 
Rift Valley, coming under attack from the militia, sought protection from the Mungiki. Other 
ethnic militias also emerged at the time, including the Chinkororo (among the Kisii) and the 
Taliban (among the urban Luo). 
Although examining the violence instigated by national political figures is certainly important 
for understanding the dynamics of Kenya’s contemporary violence, there are multiple centres 
or levers of instrumentation that need to be considered. Not all forms of instrumentation can 
be linked to a national-level political actor. The role of community-level political entrepreneurs 
is equally important and requires examination. The report on the 2007 post-election violence 
by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, a statutory body, noted that many 
local-level leaders mobilised violence against members of targeted communities. A number 
of studies on ethnic violence in Kenya have drawn similar conclusions, even though these 
local-level mobilisers have not received the same attention as have national-level political 
actors.11 The failure to recognise the instrumental use of violence in local politics means that 
interventions miss local-level figures who wield significant influence over the dynamics of 
peace and security in particular communities. 
Explanations of political violence in Kenya also often miss its connections with ordinary 
criminal violence. Many of the state and non-state actors involved in violence draw on 
multiple identities – political, criminal and sometimes cultural. The Mungiki are a good 
illustration of this. As the report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence 
noted, Mungiki and other criminal gangs were not only used by politicians in the 2008 
violence but had managed to ‘intersect with parts of the Government and the security forces’ 
to create ’shadow governments’ with effective control over security in certain areas (Republic 
of Kenya 2008: 23). Many of these groups now oscillate between working as enforcers and 
mobilisers for politicians, and as criminal outfits engaged in ordinary criminal activities. 
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 This is the view of almost all reports by human rights groups. Official inquiries also point to this instrumentalisation. 
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 See: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (2008); Human Rights Watch (2008); Ruteere (2008). 
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Another interesting aspect is the evolution of criminal violence into other forms of ethnic and 
political violence. A World Bank study on urban violence found that ‘the policy approach of 
treating different forms of violence separately clashes with the reality that the lines between 
different expressions of violence – from domestic to collective political violence – are very 
blurry’.(World Bank 2010: xiv). In many cases, what becomes ethnic violence or political 
violence often begins as criminal violence – such as theft, burglary or murder. In many poor 
urban neighbourhoods of Nairobi, settlements are ethnically concentrated, with different 
communities occupying different sections of the settlements. Since in many of these 
neighbourhoods residents rely on self-help to address insecurity and crime, those usually 
mobilised to respond to an incident of burglary will be members of one ethnic group. Where 
the suspected perpetrator is from a different ethnic group, such vigilante responses can 
easily escalate into a more serious conflict, with ethnic inflections.12 For instance, where a 
suspected criminal from the Luo ethnic group is accused of stealing from someone from the 
Kikuyu community, a vigilante group made of Kikuyus may be mobilised to attack the 
suspected criminal. An attack on a Luo by a predominantly Kikuyu vigilante group is likely to 
be seen by the Luo as an ethnic attack rather than a response to a criminal act. 
Consequently, a counter-vigilante group made up of the Luo is likely to be mobilised to 
retaliate, turning what started as criminal violence into ethnic violence. From that stage, local 
politicians are likely to insert themselves into the issue, further politicising the violence. 
Without recognising how the different categories of violence link with each other, policy 
interventions are likely to only address the tail-end of the violence which manifests itself as 
political. Yet, the roots and beginnings of violence in many poor urban neighbourhoods 
actually lie in ‘ordinary’ insecurities as well as in ethnic patterns of settlement. Although 
national political figures play on these local-level divisions and violence, which can then 
mutate into something far more serious, they do not always instigate the violence to begin 
with.13 
3.3 Unemployment and poverty 
Poverty and the lack of economic opportunities for young people are widely regarded as key 
motivations for violence, crime and insecurity (Republic of Kenya 2008). One of the findings 
of the 2010 World Bank study on urban violence was the ‘strong perception in all of the 
communities studied that unemployment, especially of youth, is driving violence’. (World 
Bank 2010: xv). The Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) process that led to 
the cessation of 2008 post-election violence acknowledged youth unemployment as one of 
the key factors behind the violence, as groups of youths looted for economic gain as well as 
organising themselves into groups-for-hire to attack members of opposing groups. The 
KNDR underlined the urgency and importance of tackling youth unemployment as a major 
threat to Kenya’s social and political stability. Many slum residents in Nairobi also claim that 
young people have been driven to illegal economic activity and crime because of poverty and 
the lack of available economic opportunities (Mutahi 2011). 
Some of the earliest studies on insecurity and crime in Kenya traced the roots of the problem 
to deprivation in slums and the increasing impoverishment of their residents (Gimode 2001). 
According to one analysis, worsening economic inequalities and growing poverty can explain 
‘more than other factors, a great deal of violent crime that characterized Kenya in the period 
under study [between 1985 and 1999]’ (Gimode 2001: 326). In the late 1980s, the Bretton 
Woods Insitutions initiated a series of economic and political reforms commonly known as 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which were aimed at restoring efficiency in all 
sectors of the economy and consequently raising the rate of economic growth. The 
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implementation of SAPs had a corrosive effect on social services, especially for the poorest, 
as the state retreated from providing many public services and goods (Rono 2002).The 
informal sector expanded as people sought to make ends meet. However, levels of income 
inequality, inflation, unemployment and retrenchment all rose, and living standards 
deteriorated. While the urban elites – many in formal employment – were cushioned from the 
worst of the economic crisis by the upward adjustments to their salaries, the urban poor did 
not enjoy such protection. The aftermath of structural adjustments coincided with a rise in 
urban crime and insecurity. Many young people were ‘diverted towards active crime by the 
social forces that do not provide them with a chance to earn a decent, gainful living’. (Gimode 
2001: 314). However, both local and national government measures to increase security in 
Nairobi, such as clearing hawkers from pavements in the city centre, or cracking down on 
matatus (privately owned public service mini-buses) that provide work for young people, only 
aggravated these underlying causes of violence and insecurity (Ruteere and Pommerolle 
2003). 
3.4 Service provision 
Violence, crime and insecurity in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods are linked to the failure of 
the state to provide basic services for a majority of people living in these areas. As noted 
previously, poor urban neighbourhoods are largely unconnected to water and electricity 
services, as they are not part of the formally planned urban residential areas. They are in 
most cases considered illegal and are largely ignored by planners. Since slums are not 
factored into formal planning, they have mostly expanded without any consideration given to 
public access to basic services, or to public safety. Street lighting is mostly non-existent in 
many poor informal settlements, meaning that the small paths and alleys of slum 
neighbourhoods are often dark at night (Amnesty International 2010). Owing to the absence 
of sanitation facilities in close proximity to their houses, many residents of slums are forced 
to walk at night to get to the few communal toilets that are available. For women in particular, 
this increases their risk of being attacked. 
The failure of the state to provide access to basic services has created an opening that has 
been exploited by criminal organisations and gangs which in some neighbourhoods have 
moved to provide illegal connections to public utilities (Agostini et al. 2010).14 These same 
groups, which are organised on the basis of ethnicity but also neighbourhood, are predatory, 
often demanding that residents and business owners pay protection money (World Bank 
2010; Mutahi 2011). In some cases, they have sought to regulate and control almost every 
aspect of life of the residents, evolving into a type of ‘shadow government’ (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2006). In some areas, some of these groups also administer their own forms of 
justice, including adjudicating disputes between residents (Mutahi 2011). In the 
neighbourhoods of Githurai and Dandora, the Mungiki has for many years assumed control 
of security functions, sometimes ridding these neighbourhoods of petty criminals and drug 
peddlers but also demanding protection fees from each household (Ruteere 2008; Servant 
2005). From the early 2000s, the group moved into regulating activities such as construction, 
requiring a fee from those planning to put up new buildings, and control over the supply of 
unskilled labour. The Mungiki also extended its control over public transport, requiring 
operators of matatus to pay a daily fee in order to be allowed to operate their vehicles in the 
city, and in particular on those routes serving the poor neighbourhoods. It is important to 
note, however, that the relationship between these groups and the residents of the slums is 
complicated, with some residents of poor urban neighbourhoods indicating that they find 
these gangs better than the police at responding to crime (World Bank 2010). However, as 
previously noted, this preference is best understood within the context of the very low level of 
public trust and confidence in existing policing and judicial institutions. 
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4 Approaches to reducing violence and 
insecurity in Nairobi 
Violence and crime are partly entrenched in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods because they are 
intertwined with governance and politics at multiple levels. In some cases, sections of the 
state and local and national political figures have cooperated with violent non-state actors in 
instigating attacks and criminal activity, including running protection rackets. Violence and 
crime thrive in poor neighbourhoods because the state and other formal actors do not 
provide access to basic services, thus making room for criminal gangs and other predatory 
actors to fill this service gap without regulation or much challenge. Better state investment in 
service delivery would challenge the predatory control of violent non-state groups that profit 
from illegal connections to water and electricity, as well as the protection fees they impose on 
businesses and residents in poor areas. Widespread poverty and lack of livelihood 
opportunities for a large number of the urban poor exacerbates their vulnerability to 
victimisation by criminal and violent actors and heightens the risks for the recruitment of 
youths into criminal and violent enterprises. 
Official approaches to violence in Nairobi have traditionally been about more robust and 
hard-edged policing measures such as raids, greater use of stop and search, and increased 
surveillance on the residents. These measures have not however improved security for the 
urban poor. The limitations of these measures are accentuated by the institutional 
weaknesses and incapacities of the police forces as well as the corruption and alleged 
complicity of some police actors in criminal activity, all of which have fatally undermined 
public trust and confidence in existing official policing agencies. 
While the associations between violence and politics are widely known, most analyses focus 
on divisions and struggles at the national level, overlooking the important role of local-level 
political entrepreneurs in violence and crime. However, much of the violence in poor 
neighbourhoods is carried out by criminal organisations and is frequently linked to complex 
local-level political struggles. The nuances and complexities of political dynamics at this level 
are often difficult to see and understand, hence the need for intimate local knowledge. 
Nevertheless, responses to violence are rarely informed by community-level knowledge and 
expertise on what is likely to work. Although there have been many local-level efforts to 
address violence in Nairobi’s poor urban neighbourhoods, many of these are undocumented 
and not known beyond the neighbourhoods where they are implemented. They therefore 
remain largely invisible. Yet, it is important to identify, monitor and learn from how local 
initiatives seek to address violence, with what consequences and for whom. 
Violence in these areas is often labelled as political or ethnic violence and seen as merely 
the consequence of the instrumentalisation by corrupt politicians, hoping to alter election 
outcomes, or wrest more power in particular political constituencies. This approach and view 
has often failed to recognise the connection between what is termed political or ethnic 
violence and ordinary criminal violence. In reality, the distinctions are not that neat. In some 
instances, what begins as ordinary criminal violence assumes ethnic or political tones 
depending on the ethnicity of the victims or perpetrators. In some cases, political or ethnic 
violence may camouflage itself as criminal violence. 
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The dynamics of violence in Kenya are shifting again since the establishment of a raft of new 
offices under constitutional reforms passed in 2010 and currently in force. The new 
constitution creates county-level political administrative units, each with its own governor who 
will command significant resources under the new devolved system of government. Many 
fear the spectre of all-powerful governors, usurping devolved resources for personal 
enrichment and to reward their supporters. Each county is also represented by a senator in a 
newly created upper chamber in parliament. Into the fray of newly established political and 
governance structures enter many usual suspects – strong (rich) men reflecting diverse and 
diverging ethnic and regional constituencies – as well as new political entrepreneurs. How 
the dynamics of old and new intersect in Kenya’s changing political dispensation is unclear. 
In light of this context and the inter-linkages between violence and a predatory type of 
politics, a different approach is required, in order to address more deeply rooted problems of 
poverty and unemployment, particularly among young people, as well as the lack of basic 
services provided in poor neighbourhoods. Public opinion surveys also indicate that 
measures to address youth unemployment and improve the urban environment, such as 
through improved street lighting and infrastructure, can make a positive difference in 
addressing violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods (see Table 4.1). A number of existing 
initiatives designed to provide work for young people and to provide better services are 
considered below. These initiatives, however, are not linked with a wider approach to 
address and mitigate violence, even though they could contribute to these goals. Apart from 
the Safer Nairobi Initiative, which is discussed below, and which aimed at providing a 
framework for various stakeholders to coordinate their actions to enhance security in Nairobi, 
there have been few efforts to bring together the efforts of different government departments 
and security agencies as well as non-state actors and groups. 
Table 4.1 Most important policy changes to address crime and violence 
problems 
Policy intervention (%) 
Youth employment programmes 58.4 
More police presence 44.9 
Improved street lighting 29.0 
Employment programmes 28.7 
Increase community policing  25.5 
More community-oriented policemen 21.7 
More infrastructure 15.6 
Recreational programmes for youths  14.4 
Ban on drugs 11.4 
Ban on illicit alcohol 10.3 
Gun control 7.0 
Ban community video show rooms 4.2 
Mediation programmes 2.0 
Other responses  
(arrest criminals, reduce corruption, introduce village elders, community-based organisations) 
0.9 
Source: World Bank 2010: 242 
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4.1 Providing economic opportunities for young people 
A number of policy interventions aimed at providing economic opportunities and employment 
for young people have been initiated by various state and non-state agencies including the 
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, the Ministry of Cooperatives and the World Bank. At the 
policy level, the Ministry of Sports, Culture and the Arts (formerly the Ministry of Youth Affairs 
and Sports) produced the Kenya National Youth Policy Sessional Paper No. 3, which 
provides guidelines on how to address youth unemployment in order to prevent a descent 
into crime and violence.15 
The Youth Policy Sessional Paper No. 3 addresses several major issues: unemployment and 
underemployment; health-related problems; high school drop-out rates; crime and deviant 
behaviour; limited sports and recreation facilities; abuse and exploitation of youth; limited 
participation and lack of opportunities in political and economic spheres; limited and poor 
housing; and limited access to information and communication technology. In order to tackle 
these issues, the policy stresses the need to implement distinctive, complementary and 
multisectoral youth programmes involving both state and non-state actors: ‘The National 
Youth Policy will ensure that government authorities work in a cooperative and harmonious 
manner when designing and delivering programmes and services which address youth 
development needs and opportunities.’ (Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports 2012). The 
Ministry has also developed the National Policy for Youth Polytechnics and Vocational 
Training Centres, which aims to equip young people with skills to improve their employment 
prospects.16 
The Youth Enterprise Fund was established in 2006 to extend small loans to young people to 
establish businesses. Popularly known as ‘the Youth Fund’, it has nevertheless had its share 
of challenges. For one thing, policy and legislative frameworks to support growth of youth 
enterprises are weak. Second, the capital investment required by young entrepreneurs to 
access non-credit services – such as business development services, market support, 
operational overheads, and public sensitisation and education campaigns – is huge 
compared with the actual loans disbursed to the successful applicants. Inadequate 
repayment of loans by the young people also poses a major challenge to the Fund, whose 
financial base is limited. This has slowed down implementation of the interventions.17 
However, through partnership with the Ministry of Cooperatives Development, the Youth 
Fund has supported 24 savings and credit societies (Saccos). Besides being marketing 
vehicles for youth enterprises, these Saccos are also financial intermediaries through which 
the Fund can reach members with credit facilities.18 The Ministry of Cooperatives has also 
helped organise young people into savings and credit societies in the transport industry in 
places such as the Kayole and Huruma areas of Nairobi, where operations have been 
controlled by criminal gangs. 
Stonebridge Multipurpose SACCO was one of 17 groups supported by the former Ministry of Youth 
Affairs. It now owns seven lorries and is engaged in the transport of building materials to private 
constructors in the Dandora area of Nairobi. The group has also been sub-contracted to provide 
trucking services to the government road construction project. They have now moved from the 
shadow economies of protection levies to legal operations. They take and service bank loans and 
have to report their earnings to the state. 
Source: Participant contribution at a forum organised to discuss youth violence and policy interventions, 1 November 2012. 
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 Remarks by an official from the Ministry of Youth Affairs during a forum organised to discuss youth violence and policy 
interventions, 1 November 2012. 
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 Remarks by an official from the Ministry of Cooperatives during a forum organised to discuss youth violence and policy 
interventions, 1 November 2012. 
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The decision by the Minister of Finance to remove the import duty on motorcycles in 2008 
significantly reduced the cost of motorcycles, allowing many young people to purchase them 
in order to set up a taxi business. The Ministry of Cooperatives has encouraged young 
people to form themselves into savings and credit cooperatives so as to access loans though 
the Ministry.19 Some policymakers have observed that the decision has helped to curb 
violence.20 Many youths who were previously involved in crime entered the motorcycle 
transport business. Although no data are available that correlate crime and violence 
prevalence and the business opportunities opened up by the possibility of acquiring a 
motorcyle, several newspaper reports as well as conversations with some of the young 
people involved in this kind of business suggest that it has indeed helped to reduce violence 
(Murage 2012). 21 
The World Bank has provided finance to the Kenyan government to establish the Kenya 
Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP), which includes a labour-intensive works and social 
services programme known as Kazi kwa Vijana to provide manual jobs for young people. 
Another component of KYEP aims to build the capacity of youth through internships and 
training coordinated by the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA). Priority is given to the six 
growth sectors within Vision 2030,22 namely: energy; finance; tourism; ICT; manufacturing 
and medium and small enterprises; and capacity-building and policy development for the 
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.23 By September 2012, a total of 1,057 (415 female) had 
successfully completed life skills training courses while 341 mentors had been identified to 
guide and train the project interns. A total of 916 interns had been successfully placed in 
jobs. Core Business Skills Training provided during the project’s first cycle had been received 
by 883 interns – those in the informal sector received three weeks of training while those in 
the formal sector received five weeks.24 However, officials from KEPSA note that the project 
is still too limited in its reach, given the high numbers of unemployed young people. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of coordination between the KEPSA intervention and other 
similar projects, which has prevented it from tapping into benefits it could have accrued from 
networking and alliance-building.25 
These interventions are few in a context of widespread youth unemployment (it is estimated 
that 46 per cent of the youth population of slums is unemployed) (World Bank 2006) and 
poverty. Further, many interventions focus narrowly on entrepreneurship even though many 
young people have little interest in or the necessary ability for running their own businesses. 
Except for the work by the Ministry of Cooperatives, the other policy interventions are 
designed for ‘youth’ in general and there is no strategic focus on young people who are more 
likely to be recruited into criminal gangs. Public visibility of these interventions is also lacking 
and the agencies have not done enough to reach the potential beneficiaries.26 Moreover, no 
clear attempts have been made to link different government interventions and agencies to 
the problem of youth unemployment. For instance, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Youth Affairs and Sports do not have any joined-up approach to combine their efforts to 
build the skills of young people or prepare them for employment. Nor is the work of skills-
building through youth polytechnics, which the Ministry of Youth and Sports has rolled out, 
consciously linked to the interesting work of the Ministry of Cooperatives. 
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Besides these policy interventions by the coalition government under President Kibaki, there 
are many local-level initiatives by NGOs and community groups aimed at improving the slum 
environment. Some of these have had positive impacts. One, Ghetto Green in Huruma, is led 
by an ex-Mungiki member. It is a youth-led initiative that seeks to rehabilitate and provide 
income opportunities for young people who have been involved in crime. The Ghetto Green 
youth are engaged in activities such as clearing public dumpsites and starting micro-
enterprises for young people such as car washing and fruit vending. The initiative is 
supported through the savings of its members. There is, however, constant tension between 
the members and the local police, who view most of the young people as potential criminals, 
despite the fact that the police force is in theory expected to promote community policing. 
The Ghetto Green initiative represents a more comprehensive approach to violence 
reduction even though its sustainability is precarious, in the absence of state support. The 
initiative also illustrates the incoherence of state policies to reduce violence and insecurity in 
Kenya, as the police do not see it as a potential solution to these problems.27 
The Umande Trust, an NGO that works on water and sanitation in Kenya’s poor urban 
neighbourhoods, has helped construct ‘bio-centres’, which provide sanitation facilities to the 
residents in Kibera and Korogocho settlements of Nairobi, for a fee. In total Umande Trust 
has 57 biocentres, of which 40 are supported by the Water Services Trust Fund, a state 
corporation established under the Water Act of 2002 with the mandate ‘to assist in financing 
the provision of water services to areas of Kenya which are without adequate water services’. 
The bio-centres are owned and run by the communities, and each services around 300 
people. They also incorporate a community centre for meetings. The Water Services Trust 
Fund emphasises community support and it is the community that chooses the site where 
the bio-centres are going to be located. The Trust draws labour for each project from the 
local community; this has helped in cementing the ownership of the projects, and the Trust is 
not seen as a government body. 
The Umande Trust reports positive results from the involvement of the community in the 
biocentres. Some young people have stopped being involved in crime, through having taken 
part in building a bio-centre. In Mukuru slum, Umande Trust worked with the Tegemeo youth 
in building a bio-centre. All the materials such as stones and cement were sourced from the 
community. The Tegemeo group now earns between Ksh. 35,000 and Ksh. 70,000 per 
month from the bio-centre and hall hire. These young people are no longer engaged in 
crime.28 
4.2 Service provision 
The absence of the state and state agencies in the provision of essential services in poor 
urban neighbourhoods is seen by many policy analysts as the opportunity exploited by 
criminal groups and cartels to provide such services. It therefore follows that one of the ways 
to counter the activities of these criminal groups, and consequently to reduce violence, is to 
set up schemes for the legal provision of essential services. One such intervention is by the 
Water Services Trust Fund which was constituted to provide water to those who may not 
otherwise be served. 
For many years, access to water supply in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods was in the hands 
of illegal vendors, and increasingly was controlled by criminal groups. The city council would 
conduct raids into these neighbourhoods and dismantle illegal connections, which often 
resulted in violent confrontations with the residents. In 2008, the Water Services Trust Fund 
and the Water Services Board under the Ministry of Water and Irrigation initiated a project to 
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16 March 2013. 
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provide water to residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements. The project set out to establish 
water kiosks that would be operated by licensed water vendors. Areas served by this 
arrangement include Kibera, which is the largest informal settlement in Nairobi. This initiative 
has improved access to water at controlled prices in certain neighbourhoods and in so doing 
it has displaced the criminal cartels that previously controlled water vending in these areas 
(Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2010). The opening times of the water kiosks 
are regulated, as are the tariffs, which must be displayed. For instance, it now costs 
residents in Kibera Ksh. 2 per 20 litres of water compared with the past when unlicensed 
vendors and cartels would retail the same amount of water for between Ksh.10 and Ksh. 20. 
The water kiosks have greatly reduced the distance travelled to fetch water, especially by 
women, thus increasing their security in areas that are prone to violent crime. The project 
also incorporates the construction of public toilets, to improve sanitation. By doing this, the 
Nairobi Water Services Board gets its revenue, the slum-dwellers get clean water and some 
of the youth groups that are engaged by the Board are no longer involved in criminal activity. 
To address the problem of illegal power connections in slum settlements, the Kenya Power 
and Lighting Company has explored ways to provide electricity to the settlements. The World 
Bank, acting as administrator for the Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (GPOBA), 
provided a grant of US$5.24 million to increase access to electricity for low-income 
households in Kenya. The project will subsidise connections to the electricity grid for around 
66,000 households (roughly 265,000 people) in Kibera and informal settlements in the 
Western, Central and Coast Provinces.29 Through this project, KPLC will: install pre-payment 
meters to meet the needs of the clients with irregular income and to address challenges for 
Kenya Power such as revenue collection; use technologies that reduce theft opportunities 
and allow remote operations; use low-cost technical solutions that reduce connection costs; 
and involve stakeholders in communication and the rolling-out of the project. According to an 
official from Umande Trust, they have advised the KPLC to use local manpower in the slums 
to assist in connecting electricity since ‘these are the same people who illegally connect the 
electricity and you cannot hear any cases of them being electrocuted, and arresting tenants 
who have illegal power connections will not solve the problem’.30 
Another important intervention is the Safer Nairobi Initiative which started in 2001 with the 
technical and financial support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
UN Habitat (Nairobi City Council 2008). Envisaged under the initiative was a victimisation 
survey, the first of its kind in Kenya, which was concluded and published in 2002; it was 
discussed in more detail above in Section 1. As a follow-up, the city council also developed 
the Nairobi Crime Prevention and Urban Safety Strategy, aimed at providing a framework for 
various stakeholders to cooperate and coordinate their actions to enhance safety and 
security in the city. The Strategy was adopted by the Council in 2005. The aim of the strategy 
was to reduce crime and insecurity in a sustainable way through better coordination within 
the city council departments and by the creation of stronger partnerships between the private 
sector and civil society. It envisaged the sharing of expertise and resources between the 
different role players and the enhancement of the capacity of the City Council and the 
criminal justice system to better enforce law and by-laws. 
Some of the activities under this strategy included the review of council by-laws, the 
upgrading of open spaces such as the Jeevanjee Gardens in Nairobi, the pedestrianisation 
of some of the streets of Nairobi, and engagement with young people to develop messages 
on security. Most of these activities were focused on downtown Nairobi rather than poor 
urban neighbourhoods. However, a few measures were specific to those neighbourhoods. In 
particular, the measures to improve lighting in poor neighbourhoods through the work of the 
                                               
29
 KPLC financial annual report and financial statements for financial year ended 30 June 2012. 
30
 Interview with an official of Umande Trust, a community-based organisation working in various informal settlements in Nairobi, 
16 March 2013. 
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Adopt A Light Company made a useful contribution in improving security through the 
installation of light masts in poor neighbourhoods. The efforts by the Nairobi Central 
Business District Association and the Kenya Human Rights Commission to promote 
community policing were also incorporated in the Council Strategy.31 However, the strategy 
also incorporated more hard-edged policing approaches such as the removal of street 
families and hawkers from the city and the installation of CCTV. 
The safety and security initiative by the City Council also ran into difficulties from competition 
and conflicts with central government, which is represented by the provincial administration 
officials. In addition, the City Council’s endemic inefficiency and reputation for corruption 
weakened its ability to win public confidence and legitimacy in the implementation of the 
strategy. 
 
                                               
31
 The community policing initiative was not successful, as in many places it became the opportunity for the police to extort 
bribes and harass those seen as a ‘threat’ to security in the central business district. In some of the poor neighbourhoods where 
it was piloted, it ran into the problem of clashing views of, on the one hand, the police who interpreted it as the recruitment of 
informers from the community, and on the other, residents who demanded better police accountability. See: Ruteere and 
Pommerolle (2003). 
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5 Conclusion 
Violence and crime are endemic in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, where they enmesh with 
wider problems of vulnerability – the failure of the state to provide for basic needs in health, 
education and social care, as well as a lack of work and training opportunities for its young 
people. However, existing law and order approaches to address violence through more 
robust policing measures in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods miss the point that there are 
limits to policing when dealing with a problem that has multiple drivers. Not only do stronger 
police measures fail because there is no public confidence or trust in policing bodies, they do 
little to address the more deeply seated causes of violence. A different approach is required 
to tackle the underlying problems of poverty and unemployment, particularly among young 
people, as well as the lack of basic services provided in poor neighbourhoods. Public opinion 
surveys also indicate that measures to deal with youth unemployment and improve the urban 
environment such as through improved street lighting and infrastructure can make a positive 
difference in addressing violence and crime in poor neighbourhoods. 
The need to implement a joined-up response to violence and crime has long been 
recognised, but existing efforts to do so have had disappointing outcomes. The Safer Nairobi 
Initiative, which had some small positive impacts, became mired in a political struggle 
between Nairobi City Council officials and provincial administration authorities. Yet the spirit 
of this effort was right to promote a coordinated approach to improve urban security by 
involving agencies and departments with mandates to deliver public services and create 
work opportunities. Separately, some public utility companies have sought to improve 
regulation of services that often come under the control of predatory gangs and cartels in 
poor neighbourhoods. In Kibera, the Nairobi Water and Sewerage Services Company has 
sought to better regulate water vending, which has been controlled by gangs in certain areas. 
Looking forward, devolution, as captured in the new 2010 Constitution, provides an 
opportunity for inter-agency and multi-stakeholder involvement in security matters at the sub-
national level. In the new devolved system of governance, security agencies and security 
remains the mandate of the national government, but implementation of many services that 
could reduce the vulnerability of the poor to violence are devolved to county governments. In 
health, education and housing, among others, the role of the central government will be 
limited to policy formulation; delivery of services will be the responsibility of newly established 
county governments. The constitution also assigns certain roles to the counties which have 
security and safety implications, such as control of alcohol and drug use. County 
governments will also be responsible for issuing trade licences and regulating housing, two 
functions that can be used effectively to curtail illegal and exploitative businesses and 
business practices. Policy interventions can therefore draw from the participation and 
competencies of various actors at the county and national levels to design comprehensive 
violence reduction strategies that go beyond traditional law and order responses. 
In April 2013 Uhuru Kenyatta was sworn in as Kenya’s fourth president of Kenya. It is too 
early to make any bold arguments with regard to the policy direction of the new government 
of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Nevertheless, in its pre-election manifesto the Uhuru 
government pledged to lay emphasis on creating employment and livelihood opportunities for 
young people. The manifesto promises to allocate 2.5 per cent of national revenue annually 
towards the Youth Fund and to redesign along the lines of the Constituency Development 
Fund to provide direct state funding for social projects. It also pledges that the government 
will give interest-free loans to young people. Although the governors of various counties have 
been sworn in, it is too early to determine the level to which county government will invest in 
policy interventions to address violence reduction. 
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5.1 Priorities for action 
This study proposes the following priorities to address and mitigate the impacts of violence 
on the poor in Nairobi. These are directed to both central and county-level officials as well as 
non-state actors implementing initiatives intended to address the causes and continuation of 
violence: 
 Promote multisectoral and multi-agency policy interventions to address 
and mitigate violence and crime. The need to more systematically address 
violence should inform ongoing efforts under the new government to review 
policies and strategies across different sectors. A multi-level governance lens 
is also important to seek ways of combining different levels of thinking, 
resources, expertise and authority at central, county and community levels. 
 Incorporate analysis of politics and violence into assessment of policies 
and measures to strengthen youth employment and basic services in 
poor neighbourhoods. While it is well known that a wider approach is 
required to address and mitigate violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods, 
there is no systematic effort to assess how initiatives to tackle youth 
unemployment or improve the delivery of basic services affect the vulnerability 
of the poor to violence and crime. Thus, policy stakeholders have little insight 
into what works, in which circumstances and how. Monitoring and evaluation 
of efforts to improve youth employment and basic services in poor 
neighbourhoods should assess how they intersect with politics and violence. 
Doing so will strengthen the evidence base for what measures can make a 
difference and how. This recommendation applies both to state and non-state 
actors working on violence reduction. 
 Learn from existing community efforts to address and mitigate violence. 
Responses to violence are rarely informed by community-level knowledge and 
expertise on what is likely to work. While there have been many local-level 
efforts to address violence in Nairobi’s poor urban neighbourhoods, many of 
these are undocumented and not known beyond the neighbourhoods where 
they are implemented. They therefore remain largely invisible. However, it is 
important to identify, monitor and learn from how local initiatives seek to 
address violence, with what consequences and for whom. Both state actors 
and non-state actors should invest in learning from local initiatives and in 
documenting the good lessons from those initiatives. 
 Carry out further rigorous empirical analysis of the setting and 
circumstances of violence in Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods. There is a 
lack of detailed, disaggregated data and evidence to do a forensic analysis of 
the causes of violence that could be used to craft more effective policy, legal, 
policing and development measures. Given that much of the violence in poor 
neighbourhoods is carried out by criminal organisations and often linked to 
complex local-level political struggles, the nuances and complexities of 
political dynamics at this level are often difficult to see and understand. Thus, 
new empirical data are required, drawing on intimate local knowledge. It is the 
responsibility of government and non-state institutions and their development 
partners to determine the sorts of data that can provide clearer insights into 
violence and its manifestations as well as to ensure that adequate resources 
and expertise are allocated to collect these data. 
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